Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications

Philosophy, Department of

10-1-2015

Why the Struggle Against Coloniality is Paramount
to Latin American Philosophy
Grant J. Silva
Marquette University, grant.silva@marquette.edu

Published version. APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Fall 2015):
8-12. Permalink. © 2015 American Philosophical Association. Used with permission.

APA NEWSLETTER | HISPANIC/L ATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY

16. I got the idea for this distinction in a conversation with Bernard
Kobes, who pointed me to John Searle’s distinction between
regulative rules and constitutive rules in Speech Acts (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1969), 33. The distinction is this:
“regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently
existing forms of behaviour; for example, many rules of etiquette
regulate inter-personal relationships which exist independently
of the rules. But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they
create or define new forms of behaviour. The rules of football or
chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football or
chess, but as it were they create the very possibility of playing
such games.”
17. Most philosophers, under the influence of liberal individualism
perhaps, would reject this view on the grounds that there is
not a proper way to be a Latino/a and also no proper way to be
a Latino/a philosopher. After all, to claim that there are moral
obligations in virtue of one’s (unchosen) race or ethnicity, they
would say, is to essentialize the very same, which is descriptively
mistaken insofar as races are not real, and it might be thought
to be morally impermissible insofar as it denies the “priority
of individual liberty,” or imposes unwanted obligations on
individuals without their consent. I am of the mind that this line
of argument is mistaken in regard to racialized and oppressed/
marginalized groups. Someone wanting to make the case would
want, however, to distinguish between the in-fact rules which
our social reality collectively sustains, some of which may be
pernicious (e.g., Jim Crow-era rules of conduct), and those that
would be appropriate rules for people of color to adopt in order
to combat oppression. In a future work, I would like to expand on
this theme, but here I set this issue aside.
18. This, of course, is not to say that we cannot criticize our
philosophical forbears. It is just to point to the social meaning
attached to the disavowal and dismissal of LALo/a philosophy by
other philosophers, and particularly by Latino/a philosophers.

Why the Struggle Against Coloniality Is
Paramount to Latin American Philosophy
Grant J. Silva
M ARQUETTE UNIVERSIT Y

As a Latino philosopher who teaches and specializes in Latin
American philosophy, I am often frustrated by explanations
of this subfield that describe it as “philosophy, just south
of the United States border” or “any kind of philosophy
done in Latin America.”1 Other ways of putting this suggest
that Latin American philosophy is an area of thought
concerned with the history of philosophy in Latin America
as opposed to the possibility of a distinctive Latin American
philosophy, the former often a report on easily recognizable
sub-disciplines—such as Marxism, phenomenology,
philosophical anthropology, analytic philosophy, axiology,
philosophy of law—as they have taken place in Latin
America (including Brazil), the Caribbean, and even
amongst Latino/as in the United States.2 Although meant to
be inclusive (perhaps too inclusive), the above descriptions
are vague and mislead those unfamiliar with the field. They
eclipse a “tradition,” for lack of a better word, that takes the
idea of Latin America and all the identity crises that come
with this regional affiliation as the point of departure for
philosophical analysis and practice.3
This tradition places much importance on the goal of
liberation, the idea of freedom (an idea realized in various
ways), the significance and unavoidability of “place” or
one’s circumstance, and the need for creativity and/or
“openness,” especially in terms of how one thinks and lives
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in light of coloniality (not just colonization), as central to
philosophical practice. The previous, however, are topics
and concerns of great importance in other branches of
philosophy and even in other disciplines. Thus, as Jorge J. E.
Gracia explains below (in so many words), I am perhaps only
capable of painting a picture of Latin American philosophy
as “philosophy born of [colonial] struggle,” to slightly tweak
the phrase coined by the African American philosopher
Leonard Harris.4 This limitation is not a problem; I have
no problem viewing Latin American philosophy as part of
a larger philosophical practice committed to struggling
against coloniality in its various manifestations. I think this
imbues Latin American philosophy with a proclivity towards
praxis that is missing in most of academic philosophy. In
addition, I think there is an important difference between
philosophizing from freedom and philosophizing for the
sake of freedom. Philosophy looks different and often
assumes “non-canonical,” “non-philosophical,” or “nontraditional” purposes and problematics in political and
socio-economic contexts plagued by ongoing structures of
oppression, especially those resulting from coloniality.
For the most part, philosophers residing in imperial,
developed countries are typically free (or at least free
enough) to think without the constraints or burdens of their
particular social, cultural, racial, and gendered existence.
These individuals tend to think “universally” and their
subjectivity or identity rarely enters the philosophical
purview, except for discussions of identity writ large (in
the sense that J. Locke talks about personal identity). This
is especially true when the face of philosophy reflects
the dominant racial, gender, class, and/or sexual norm,
or when one’s status in country or place of residence is
authorized by the state; that is, when one’s subjectivity is
legally, metaphysically, and socio-historically secure. To
philosophize from this perspective does not mean that
one is totally free of conflict or strife, for nobody lives a
life free of turmoil of some kind. Nevertheless, there exist
ways of practicing philosophy that begin from socially
advantageous positions that subsequently delimit the
philosophical practice.
For those in colonial (and even “post-colonial”) circumstances
that find themselves on the side of underdevelopment,
poverty, marginality, and domination, this luxury is not so
apparent.5 For those that think for the sake of freedom the
exigencies of their circumstances force a critical reflective
stance that targets oppression, structural inequalities,
pain, and suffering. Since “privileged” philosophers think
from perspectives where their interests and problems
are recognized and align with traditional or historical
philosophical problematics, their status as philosophers
is never in question. Those philosophers who begin from
contested, dominated, and oppressed social locales are said
to think about “non-philosophical” issues, their discourses
remain unauthorized and non-canonical for reasons that
reflect nothing other than bias, blatant disregard, and the
force of history.6 These are the non-philosophers, the ones
that use philosophy for instrumental reasons, and in so
doing jeopardize their stance in academic and intellectual
circles—this where I place Latin American philosophy.
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While the above dichotomy admits of problems on multiple
levels, it nonetheless presents opportunity to examine the
difference offered by Latin American and other ways of
doing philosophy. Whatever Latin American philosophy
(LAP) may be, philosophy at the service of freedom plays
a crucial role in the tradition I am concerned with, one
that cannot be subsumed into a retelling of the history
of Western thought as it has taken place south of the U.S.
border. More than just the history of philosophy in the
region, Latin American philosophy is an example of what
philosophy looks like in the face of coloniality.7
What follows contains a weak claim and a strong claim
(perhaps a better way of describing these is to say
descriptive and normative). The weaker claim is that one can
interpret or describe the works of various Latin American
philosophers as concerned with freedom, liberty, and the
problem of colonization or coloniality, even when this is
not the explicit goal of the author. More often than not, no
interpretation is needed. Whether it is national liberation
or questions of mestizaje; epistemic or political justice
for indigenous peoples; freedom from political, racial,
or gender oppression imposed by a patriarchal/colonial
order; the importance of authenticity or originality in light
of colonialism; or even anti-essentialist understandings
of Latino/a identity, a majority of what constitutes Latin
American philosophy revolves around, has been impacted
by and concerned with, coloniality and liberation. This is not
to suggest that every page of Latin American philosophy
contains the words “colonial,” “coloniality,” “liberation,”
or derivatives of these terms. Nevertheless, I believe that
one is hard pressed to find “pure” philosophical content
in Latin America that is not in some way engendered by
or valued for its contribution to Latin American societies
or cultures. This imbues Latin American philosophy with
a tendency towards political thought, such that the term
“Latin American political philosophy” is a pleonasm at best
and a tautology at worst.
So as to take the more difficult route, I offer Gracia’s thoughts
on why coloniality or colonization cannot be the basis for
LAP as an example of an implicit instance where liberationthemes nonetheless abound. In his essay, “Ethnic Labels
and Philosophy,” Gracia argues that what is distinctive
about Latin American philosophy, or that which unites Latin
American thinkers under the umbrella of “Latin American
philosophy,” cannot be “the experience of so-called
coloniality, or even perhaps marginality.”8 Colonization
cannot serve as the basis for Latin American philosophy
since not all experiences of colonialism are uniform nor is
colonization unique to Latin American history. Coloniality
as the basis for Latin American philosophy establishes
conditions that are either too strict, such that it leaves
out some of the region’s best thinkers who never wrote
a word about colonization, or this criterion establishes
conditions that are satisfied by many non-Latin Americans,
e.g., Africans, Asians, and perhaps even North Americans.
At best, Gracia continues, “even if one were to accept that
coloniality is in fact something that characterizes Latin
American philosophy, this would help to separate it only
from philosophy which is a product of the First World, not
from the philosophy of other parts of the world that have
also suffered colonial exploitation.”9
FALL 2015 | VOLUME 15 | NUMBER 1

There is much to appreciate in Gracia’s comments,
particularly his anti-essentialism and turn to a familialhistorical model for understanding group identities
(Gracia’s modus operandi10). Both are worthwhile
contributions to philosophy of race and ethnicity, and, as
I will suggest, epitomize a Latin American philosophical
concern with freedom from totalizing concepts, the type of
which are typified by colonial impositions. Gracia assumes
that like ethnic groups themselves, it is wrong to think
of “ethnic philosophies” in essentialized ways that rely
upon necessary and sufficient conditions. There is no one
definitive characteristic or trait that defines the members
of an ethnic group. Instead, ethnic groups are cluster
concepts, groupings united on their relation to a variety
of traits to characteristics, none of which are necessary
and often context-specific. Ethnic philosophies supervene
on ethnic groups, and the fact that members of an ethnic
group do not share in a single feature entails that a
philosophy arising from this group cannot harbor universal
characteristics. Gracia holds that “ethnic philosophies
are historical realities enmeshed in webs of complicated
relations.” He continues, “a proper understanding of them
must reflect this reality [. . .] the conditions of membership
vary, as history itself does, allowing for different groupings
and ways of looking at them.”11
There are two dimensions of Gracia’s views that are worth
focusing on. One pertains to the idea of history itself;
the other to how history is interpreted. There are various
ways of explaining what history is: (1) facts or events
that have taken place; (2) interpretation or accounts of
facts as performed by historians; and (3) “history” as a
discipline, which entails an assortment of meta-historical
and methodological principles and commitments.12 This
variegated understanding of history results in no exclusive
way of looking at the past or even agreement upon what
constitutes “history.” One’s interests, goals, proximity, or
distance to the subject in question condition how they
view the past. To impose a single monolithic interpretation
of the past frustrates other ways of viewing history and,
more importantly, preempts the formulation of novel
perspectives. For ethnic philosophies like Latin American
philosophy, such imperial approaches to its history limit
the range of possible interpretations (and manifestations)
in the present and future. As I take it, Gracia’s views are not
just about the multiplicity that is the past, but also about
the dynamic and creative nature of the present determined
by that “past” and the possibility for an open future. To
say that all members of an ethnic philosophy necessarily
share in one common feature is to totalize or master the
practice and boundaries of that philosophy. This means
the concepts that arise from this group will be limited by
the conditions that are imposed by an over-determined
historical view. This would be the colonization of a particular
ethnic philosophy.13
My “liberationist” reading of Gracia’s work is supported
by his views on ethnic groupings. While discussing the
problems that arise when one expects all Latino/as to speak
Spanish or eat beans and rice or dance salsa, namely, the
problems with stereotypes, he writes:
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These examples illustrate the fact that to be Latino
does not entail much that is generally associated
with the stereotype. But why should this lumping
and homogenization generate fear in the Latino
population? Why do we find strident voices
complaining and warning about this phenomenon?
Because we worry that by being lumped together
into one stereotyped group, the reality which we
are will be misunderstood—we will be taken as
what we are not and this can affect our lives in
significant ways, some very nefarious to our well
being. Homogenization becomes particularly
dangerous in political contexts because the
government often formulates and implements
social policy based on stereotypes.14
Again, the problem with stereotypes is that they impose
an image of what it means to be from a particular group
before individuals have a chance to define themselves.
Stereotypes limit how our reality will be understood. While
Gracia may fall back on the claim that there is no normative
dimension to his argument for the familial-historical view,
meaning that he is simply painting a more accurate picture
of reality, the moral dimensions of his train of thought are
visible in the above passage (i.e., “nefarious to our well
being”).
Gracia’s comments are reminiscent of what the philosopher
of liberation, Enrique Dussel, writes while speaking about
the victim of colonization:
Distant thinkers, those who had a perspective of
the center from the periphery, those who had to
define themselves in the presence of an already
established image of the human person and in
the presence of uncivilized fellow humans, the
newcomers, the ones who hope because they are
always outside, these are the ones who a have
clear mind for pondering reality.15
“Distant thinkers” are those residing on “the outside” of
hegemonic circles and totalizing systems; those in colonial
peripheries in relation to a center that is Europe; those
for whom their status as a rational subject implies spatial
connotations, i.e., an aperture or distance from the imposing
views of the center; those who had images of humanity’s
past cast upon them in terms of being considered
barbarian, pre-modern, savage, inferior. “Newcomers,” or
those for whom creative interpretive practices are possible,
are best suited to ponder reality since, as Dussel continues,
they do not seek to defend any privileges or ideological
perspective.
For Gracia, the lack of necessary and sufficient conditions
does not rob ethnic philosophies or ethnic groups of an
identity. Like proper names or dates of birth, there is a
sense in which ethnic philosophies have specific points of
origin or arise from a set of circumstances that is unique
to that grouping (this uniqueness does not entail that the
traits in question will not be shared by others). However,
one cannot think of that identity as anything other than
contingent and contextual. Although Latin American
philosophy may have a starting point, say the “discovery”
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of America, as Gracia does, and a range of topics that
tend to be discussed by various thinkers that fall within
this area of study, these are historically contingent and
always contextualized. Thus, what is called “Latin American
philosophy” is not meaningless, as this title signifies a
set of questions that are clumped together for a variety
of reasons, none of which should reign supreme. Thus, to
say that Latin American philosophy maintains an inherent
tendency towards liberatory thought is simply to highlight
a contingent history that makes sense in light of a desire
to differentiate Latin American philosophy from those
descriptions of this field posed at the onset of this essay
(for the reasons offered above in addition to those that
come below).
I ask, if the burden of differentiating Latin American
philosophy from Anglophonic interpretations of the
philosophical canon falls upon the texts and ideas that
do not just retell the history of Western philosophy south
of the U.S. border but represent a particular way of doing
philosophy that is unique to “Latin America” and other parts
of the world, why continue with such descriptions of LAP
as those provided at the onset of this paper? How might
those other texts, the ones that are often emphasized when
explaining what LAP is or why this area makes worthwhile
contributions to academic philosophy in the United States,
be the real difference makers, so to speak? How does this
point to that which distinguishes LAP from “mainstream”
understandings of philosophy?
To say that colonialism ought to be a starting point for
Latin American philosophy is where controversy starts.
It is problematic, I admit, to think of colonization as an
indispensable basis for Latin American philosophy (and
note that I am aware of the totalizing nature of my claim).
First off, as Gracia explained above, not all Latin Americans
have suffered colonialism equally. Here, however, I think
there is a tendency to think about the experience of
colonization strictly from the perspective of the victim. I
offer as example the way whiteness has been understood
in the context of the United States for support.
It is often the case that white people report that the
experience of race does not play a central role in their
life. Being part of the dominant racial group, race is not an
issue for whites the way it is for Blacks, Hispanics, Native
Americans, or Asians. Nonetheless, is this to say that white
identity is race-less? Is this to assume that whiteness has
not been impacted by the existence of race? Of course not;
the white experience of race—for the most part, since white
people always want to remind of the fact that nonwhites
can be racist to whites as well—is best understood as
constituting the oppressive side of race relations. Selfeffacing white people who claim to be “white-trash” sound
as ridiculous as me claiming to be “male-trash”; regardless
of how much I hate it, others will assign to me the privileges
that come with masculinity. Nevertheless, even if whites
do not “feel” race, there is a way in which white identity
is predicated on the existence of nonwhites. Given that
whiteness has often been associated with rights, privileges,
and benefits denied to others, whiteness operates more in
antagonistic ways. While we may not be able to positively
identify what whiteness is, we can, and historians often do,
FALL 2015 | VOLUME 15 | NUMBER 1
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identify the way in which whiteness is a social, political,
and legal construct that was used to exclude Asians, African
Americans, and now Hispanics.16
In short, one’s experience of race, or colonization for that
matter, does not have to begin as victim. This is pertinent
to my goals in this essay since it sets up the stronger claim:
Latin American philosophers ought to think of themselves
as concerned with “philosophers for freedom.”17 I hold this
view to such an extent that the absence of colonialism or
liberation-themes from their work can be interpreted as
a stance on colonization, especially when injustices and
inequality is ubiquitous in their immediate surroundings
(the culpability and definitiveness of silence). We can
take the absence of explicit engagement with the idea of
coloniality as the basis for one’s opinion on this topic: they
do not really care about it or represent such a privileged
approach to philosophy such that they cannot really be
considered part of the Latin American tradition.18
This stronger claim is partially supported by Ignacio
Ellacuría’s (the Jesuit philosopher murdered during the
Salvadorian civil war) views on the liberating aspects of
philosophy and his normative suggestion that philosophers
ought to concern themselves with the socio-historical
contexts they inhabit.19 Crucial to Ellacuría’s views on
philosophy are both a critical and creative components.20
Since it plays a role in supporting political and socioeconomic institutions, one of the natural targets of
philosophical critique has always been ideology. Being the
means through which humans sustain themselves, socioeconomic and political institutions are literally shaping
human reality by structuring and determining the lives
and communities of those they serve. Even though it may
be inherently neutral, ideology, an outgrowth of existing
institutions, affixes itself to the prevailing understanding of
reality and reinforces the status quo. In doing so, ideology
assists in the stifling of growth, thereby denying the
community the possibility of life. If human communities
are composed of living beings, their interests and concerns
cannot be captured by a single economic or political
structure backed by an ideological outlook that justifies
itself. That would be to say that all human problems,
concerns, and creative outputs have reached their zenith,
something obviously untrue if we are speaking about living
beings. Philosophy and philosophers fail to represent
the dynamic entity that is the community when they are
not sufficiently critical of ideology. Philosophers are
those individuals that ought to concern themselves with
this stagnation of life else they deny the conditions that
engender ensuing philosophical thought. For Ellacuría, the
fact that Latin American cultures lack a philosophy of their
own reflects part of the reason why the region remains in
the grips of inequality and violence.
Yet, never is this criticizing done for no other sake besides
questioning the status quo; an implicit goal of philosophy has
always been to bring about change, to improve the situation
at hand, or at the very least assist in making alternatives to
the status quo imaginable (and thus possible). Philosophy
does this by making clear the foundations, or lack thereof,
of ideology. For Ellacuría, without sufficient critique, there
FALL 2015 | VOLUME 15 | NUMBER 1

cannot be creativity, an aesthetical, epistemological,
existential, and even political category (remember what José
Martí says in Nuestra América: “Gobernante, en un pueblo
nuevo, quiere decir creador”).
Philosophy has always been “creative,” i.e., connected
to freedom from oppression and striving for a kind of
openness or responsiveness to life. As Ellacuría wrote in
“The Liberating Function of Philosophy,”
We can say that philosophy has always had to do
with freedom, though in different ways. It has
been assumed that philosophy is that task of free
individuals and free peoples, free at least of the
basic needs that can suppress the kind of thinking
we call philosophy. We also acknowledge that it has
a liberating function for those who philosophize
and that as the supreme exercise of reason, it has
liberated people from obscurantism, ignorance,
and falsehood. Throughout the centuries, from
the pre-Socratics to the Enlightenment, through
all methods of critical thinking, we have ascribed
a great superiority to reason, and to philosophical
reason in particular, as a result of its liberating
function.
[. . .]
This matter of philosophy and freedom gets to the
fundamental purpose of philosophical knowledge,
which even if it is understood as a search for truth,
cannot be reduced to being a search for truth for
its own sake.21
In almost a prophetic sense, to think of Latin American
philosophy as “philosophy born of colonial struggle”
returns philosophy to its original purpose. Whether it
is from ignorance, misuses of reason, political force, or
popular dogma, a liberatory dimension has always been
part of philosophy.
For Ellacuría, the beauty that is philosophical thought
renders this liberatory tendency explicit when it serves as
the mouthpiece for a community’s concerns, interests, and
means of critical and creative self-understanding. Critical
and creative thought necessitates engaging the full range
of humanity, not just the elite. Philosophers may be the
voice of the community, but they are not a revolutionary
vanguard. Part of the philosopher’s epistemological tool
kit is the greater portions of society (in Latin America),
the poor, dominated, and oppressed. Philosophers fail to
formulate complete conceptions of truth, beauty, meaning,
and value when the oppressed, poor, and marginalized are
ignored as sources for knowledge.
That being said, for one to grow up amidst colonial
oppression, experience it, or perhaps even benefit by
it, and yet not think philosophically about it takes a
tremendous amount of effort. To not write about it means
that one is an “ideologue,” which implies a denier life. It
is difficult, if not impossible, to think philosophically as a
Latin American and not be concerned with colonization or
a derivative subtopic in some way. To not do so requires
PAGE 11
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conscious effort and willful ignorance, the type of which
ought to be morally culpable. For those that worry that this
normative standard leaves out many of Latin America’s
best thinkers, I think there is a way in which we can keep
those who do not write on colonialism in the LAP canon: We
should interpret their silence on this topic as indicative of
their stance on this issue. Namely, it is an issue not worth
their attention. Their lack of concern or attention renders
them complicit with the ideology that supports the status
quo, which on the one hand stagnates the dynamism that
is the human community. In the context of Latin America,
to leave ideology intact is to turn one’s head to social
and political institutions responsible for the deaths of the
poor, oppressed, nonwhite (or insufficiently mestizo/a and
mulatto/a) masses.
What is the nature of philosophy for those who are
existentially compelled to philosophize? Philosophy, for
those in this predicament, is not a choice. It is a vocation;
the pursuit of freedom imposed by the non-freedom
one lives; a duty brought on by a reality that denies the
humanity of people. This is what Latin American philosophy
as a philosophy born of colonial struggle means, and that is
how I think about Latin American philosophy as a tradition
that exceeds the history of philosophy south of the U.S.
border.
NOTES
1.

See the comments made by Manuel Vargas in “Multicultural
Philosophy Panel 2: Comparative Philosophy” (https://vimeo.
com/58932466, accessed July 1, 2015).

2.

For a brief discussion of the difference between these
characterizations (one that also explains how they are compatible
and not antagonistic), see Susana Nuccetelli, Ofelia Schutte, and
Otávio Bueno, “Introduction” in A Companion to Latin American
Philosophy (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 1-2. See also
Nuccetelli, “Latin American Philosophy,” A Companion to Latin
American Philosophy (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 343–57.

3.

When Latin American philosophy is understood as simply the
history of philosophy in Latin America or “philosophy south of the
U.S. border,” any philosopher in Latin America or with a Hispanic
surname becomes a Latin American philosopher. I worry about
this when it comes to job prospects for those who work in this
area. I think this subfield requires more specialization rather than
just inclusion for the sake of adding numbers. I thank Kim Diáz
for reminding me of Tommy Curry’s comments in this regard.
Perhaps all this paper calls for is more specialization.

4.

See Leonard Harris (ed.), Philosophy Born of Struggle (Dubuque,
IO: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1983). Only the historical
specificity of the struggle against coloniality as it has taken place
in Latin America can differentiate Latin American philosophy
from say African, Asian, and more. I am aware that colonization
does not happen in any uniform or monolithic way; hence, my
desire to talk about “philosophy born of colonial struggle” in a
general sense.

5.

6.

The qualifier that runs throughout this sentence implicitly
acknowledges that not all who come from colonial circumstances
represent an oppressed or victimized perspective. Thus, there
are many from Latin American metropolises that represent elite
points of view and philosophize from freedom. As I explore
below, especially in my discussion of Ignacio Ellacuría’s views
on the nature of philosophy, all academic or professional
philosophers think from freedom. Some philosophers, however,
are more interested in living an understanding of philosophy that
places it at the service of various social, political, and economic
pursuits.

7.

Coloniality is not necessarily the rule of a particular colonial
order or regime, like that of Spain in Mexico or Peru, but is
the power dynamic implicit to colonial systems resulting in
stratified social hierarchies divided in terms of class, land rights,
race, gender, political power, education, and even knowledgeproprietor or that known. There are thus ontological, historical,
and epistemological dimensions to coloniality. Although national
liberation may take place, and thus a society may be “postcolonial,” there is a sense in which the power dynamics implicit
to colonization (i.e., coloniality) may still be operational. Aníbal
Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,”
Nepantla: Views from the South 1, no. 3 (2000).

8.

Jorge J. E. Gracia, “Ethnic Labels and Philosophy,” Latin American
Philosophy: Currents, Issues, Debates, Eduardo Mendieta, ed.
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2003), 63.

9.

Ibid.

10. See also Gracia, Hispanic/Latino Identity (Malden, MA: Blackwell
Publishers Inc., 2000), 48; Gracia, Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and
Nationality (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 49–55; and Gracia,
Latinos in America: Philosophy and Social Identity (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishers, 2008).
11. Gracia, “Ethnic Labels and Philosophy,” 58.
12. Ibid.
13. Compare Gracia’s thoughts on history of those of Enrique Dussel
in his recent political philosophy and ethics. Dussel begins his
three-volume work on political philosophy with the first volume a
rethinking of the history of political thought. Rather than start with
the Greeks, Dussel ventures back farther to reveal the sources for
the Greek terms for “justice,” “demos,” “equality,” and “destiny.”
See Enrique Dussel, Politics of Liberation: A Critical World History,
trans. Thia Cooper (London: SCM Press: 2011 [2007]), 15-16. His
ethics does the same. The point of comparison with Gracia is that
where multiple ways of viewing the past lead to a variety of ways
of thinking about the present and future. Novel justice claims or
ethical ideas do not come from nowhere; they have a history.
14. Gracia, Latinos in America, xi-xii. Emphasis added.
15. Ibid., 4. Emphasis added.
16. See Ian Haney López, White By Law: The Legal Construction of
Race (New York: NYU Press, 2006 [1996]).
17. At this point, some may worry that I am creating a scenario where
I undermine the dynamic nature of Latin American philosophy.
Risieri Frondizi articulated such a concern in his famous essay
“Is There an Ibero-American Philosophy?” Phenomenology and
Philosophical Research Vol. IX, no. 3 (1949). As Frondizi explains,
philosophers who attempt to think from the perspective of a
Latin American “corrupt” (my word) the philosophical process.
By trying to be Latin America or think as a Latin American, one
runs the risk of self-consciously limiting the creative process
and perhaps even obviates the possibility for an authentic LAP
(351–53). The conscious attempt to think in Latin American ways,
whatever that may be, is a self-imposed handicap that might
result in the abandonment or dismissal of many ideas that fit the
Latin American script. Much like being “cool,” one just is; trying
to be “cool” is not cool. I do not see this as much of a problem
as I do further proof of the importance of unbridled creativity (or
freedom) in LAP.
18. The following comments are inspired by Charles Mills’s
discussion of racial justice and racism in the work of John Rawls.
See Charles Mills, “Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls,” The Southern
Journal of Philosophy XLVII (2009): 161–82.
19. Ignacio Ellacuría, “The Liberating Function of Philosophy (1985),”
in Essays on History, Liberation, and Salvation,” Michael E. Lee,
ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2013), 93–119.
20. Ellacuría, “The Liberating Function of Philosophy,” 96–107.
21. Ibid., 93–119.

Along these lines, see the contributions by Ofelia Schutte and
Jorge J. E. Gracia to George Yancy’s Reframing the Practice of
Philosophy: Bodies of Color, Bodies of Knowledge (Albany: SUNY
Press, 2012).
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